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This paper uses a statistical analysis of electoral partic-
ipation data coded from voter signatures to describe patterns of 
voter turnout that prove to be heavily inﬂu-enced by the 
organization of individual voters in house-holds. Turnout patterns 
are indeed characterized both by a strong homogeneity within 
“electorate households,” and by a correlation between the status 
of each individual in the household and his or her turnout.
We deﬁne “electorate households” as a group of persons 
registered in the same polling station and living under the same 
roof. We take into account several different dimensions of voter 
turnout: we are interested in the precise moments of abstention 
as well as in changes in behaviour (from abstention to 
participation and vice versa) and of course in the mean tendency 
ofeach individual to take part or not to take part in each ballot. 
These deﬁnitions allow us to demonstrate, ﬁrst, that people who 
live together have a strong tendency to present the same 
participation patterns, and second, that the speciﬁc status of the 
voter within the household inﬂuences his or her degree of 
electoral participation. Our study is thus part of a trend of 
research that highlights the social and environmental 
determinants of voting. We however shed light on an often 
overlooked context: the household.
The paper ﬁrst explains why data collected from elec-toral 
rolls are particularly apt at allowing this sort of contextual analysis 
of patterns in electoral participation (2). It then presents the case 
study, situated in one polling station of the Parisian suburbs (3), 
and the variables that were built from the raw data (4). Finally, it 
presents our main results on the homogeneity within electorate 
households (5) and the effect of status in the household on voter 
turnout (6). The ﬁnal discussion emphasizes the potential of data 
extracted from voter signatures for complementary analyses of 
electoral behaviour (7).
2. Signature lists: sources for a contextual analysis of
electoral participation
Since Tableau de la France de l’Ouest (Siegfried, 1913) and
The People’s Choice (Lazarsfeld et al., 1944), electoral studies
have discussed the social dimension of voting behaviour,
whether it be turnout or abstention in elections, prefer-
ences expressed in the ballots, or the competence displayed
during this act. As electoral studies developed, an opposi-
tion emerged between two types of research. Some
researchers saw the voter as an individual actor empow-
ered by some sort of rationality, admittedly limited, but
effective in that it allowed the actor to express a choice
through his or her participation and his or her precise vote.
Others, stressing the importance of social and local
contexts, challenged the assumption that actors necessarily
considered voting as a conscious choice, or even that they
always cared. This article continues the second tradition of
analysis, sometimes referred to as “contextual,” consid-
ering the voter not as much as an individual that makes
a “choice” than as an actor inserted in a social and local
context that strongly inﬂuences his or her voting behaviour.
Such an assumption led us to favour the use of data on
voter participation that do not rely on voter statements, but
are the direct product of an effective voter behaviour. Our
data thus were collected in signature lists. In France, voters
must be registered on the electoral rolls. When they
participate in an election, they have to sign (e.g., initial)
their polling station’s particular signature list before
placing the envelope that contains their ballot in the ballot
box. At the close of the station, voter turnout is doubly
measured by comparing the total number of envelopes
collected from the ballot box with the number of signatures
on the list. The voters’ signature is thus lasting proof of
their turnout in the election (in the case of proxy voting, the
voter authorizes another to vote and sign in his or her
place); all citizens have access to the rolls during the week
following the election. In some places, the lists are then
destroyed, but others preserve them in ofﬁces or in
municipal archives. Our study is based on the analysis of
turnout patterns of registered voters in one polling station
between 1982 and 2008; we only have considered data for
elections with available signature lists.1
This kind of data has obvious limitations for a study of
political behaviour. They only include French citizens,2 and
only those among them who are actually registered: esti-
mates of unregistered potential voters range between 3.5%
and 11.5% (Braconnier and Dormagen, 2007b).3 More1 The signature lists of seven ballots were not available. They were
however unnecessary for three ballots, as the 1986 regional elections took
placeonthesamedayas thegeneral electionsand the twoballots of the2008
cantonal elections took place the same days as themunicipal elections; from
other similar situations, we can safely infer that almost all voters in one
election also vote in other elections taking place on the same day.
2 Since the Maastricht Treaty, the citizens of the European Union have
the right to vote in municipal and European elections only; they are
separately registered.
3 In our case study (described below), among 693 registered voters
living at 396 different postal addresses, only 492 (71%) were listed in.
telephone directoriesn while 162 addresses had no registered voter.importantly, what wemeasure is not directly the behaviour
of people actually living in a given area: as controls are very
limited, it is possible to continue to vote in a place where
one once lived.
The primary advantage of our data is their high degree
of realism. We are not working on statements about acts,
but on the acts themselves. Even if there is fraud, such as
fake voters’ signatures or actual voters’ signatures appen-
ded by unauthorized parties, the actual act of voting or not
voting is very closely recorded. We have taken into account
29,756 traces of acts of turnout or abstention, over three
decades. These data offer several beneﬁts.
First, it is well established that non-registration and
abstention are highly underreported in opinion polls
(Kenny, 1993), and that abstentionists refuse more than
voters to respond to pollers’ questions (in proportions twice
as high, according to Michelat and Simon, 1982). Studies
comparing interviews and signatures on electoral rolls even
showed that voters could be very prolix about a vote that
theyhadnotevencast, according to the lists (Braconnier and
Dormagen, 2007). This has led some analysts to give up
on including voter turnout in patterns of political partici-
pation for the sake of realismdalthough turnout remains
considered as the very foundation of modern citizenship
(Mac Clurg, 2003; Cramer Walsh et al., 2004).
A second advantage of data extracted from signature
lists is their relevance to test the role of contexts in partic-
ipation behaviour. Analyses combining survey and ecolog-
ical data have long documented the effect of local contexts
in shaping voter turnout. For example, the social composi-
tion of British constituencies inﬂuences working- and
middle-class votes (Butler and Stokes, 1969; Andersen and
Hearth, 2000). In such cases, the word “local” applies to
a relatively large spatial unit, but the notion of neighbour-
hood plays a role. Other authors have emphasized the
inﬂuence of primary groups as highlighted by the Columbia
tradition: they have shown that people who talk together
tend to vote together (Miller, 1977), and documented the
inﬂuence of households and families on individual political
orientation (Huckfeldt,1986; Johnston et al., 2001; Johnston
et al., 2005b). Households themselves are admittedly not
independent from a broader local context, butmany studies
suggest that close relationships, especially those between
spouses and between parents and children, shape the
production of political opinions (Gamson,1992; Burns et al.,
2001; Pattie and Johnston, 1999; Verba et al., 2005). The
mere fact of not living alone, but with a partner, especially
with one or two children, has been shown to enhance
participation in a study on the 2002 elections in France, that
were characterized by particularly contrasted abstention
patterns (Clanché, 2003). Most of these studies however
only take into account something wider (the place) or more
restricted (the couple) than the household. One exception is
a paper by Johnston et al. (2005b) based on data from the
British Household Panel Study: they too conclude that
people who live together vote together. They ﬁnd very high
levels of within household agreement on voting behaviour
and on changes in voting behaviour between elections.
These high levels not only refer to the political preferences
expressed, but also to the voter turnout itself, in three-
person as well as two-person households.
4 INSEE is the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies. The
survey is presented on the following webpage: http://www.insee.fr/fr/
methodes/default.asp?page¼sources/ope-enq-participation-electorale.
htm. The Permanent Demographic Sample (EDP) is the ﬁrst socio-
demographic large-scale panel (100th of the population) established in
France.The use of signature lists allows us to further this line of
studies by taking into account a large number of ballots and
by assessing the precise composition of households. As the
lists include the voters’ date and place of birth and address
and the married wives’ maiden and married names, they
allowed us to recognize married couples and generations
within households and to infer relationships with in-laws,
uncles and aunts, etc. We could also mobilize the ethno-
graphic knowledge of the environment provided by one of
us in order to characterise each neighbourhood in the
polling station. This has only partly compensated for one of
the drawbacks of signature lists: they do not provide any
socio-demographic data other than gender, age, and
marital status: the voter’s occupation, level of education, of
income, status of homeowner or tenant, etc. remain
unknown (though the occupation was recorded in some
places in the past: Dupeux, 1952; Peneff, 1981), which
forbids us both to take these factors into account at an
individual level and to construct aggregate descriptions of
the social characteristics of neighbourhoods.
Finally, it is worth noticing that there has already been
a French tradition of sociological analysis of signature lists;
although it was not concerned with inﬂuences within
households and did not always use longitudinal data, it has
produced interesting results. A pioneering work by Dupeux
(1952) found a positive correlation between proximity to
the voting station and voter turnout during the 1871 elec-
tions in one region of rural central France. Grawitz (1965)
used cross tabulation on data from Lyons to show that
women participated less than men, and married women
less than singlewomen. Lancelot’s wide study of abstention
(1968) also mobilized signature lists to describe patterns of
participation over several elections. He emphasized
“mobile abstention” (following the hypothesis previously
presented by Bodin and Touchard, 1957): most electors
were neither “consistent voters” nor “consistent absten-
tionists,” but rather “intermittent abstentionists”. He also
stated that abstentionism generally depended on the
voter’s social integration. Lancelot’s most important
successors were Subileau and Toinet (1993), whose meta-
analysis of a series of French empirical studies based on
voter behaviours in several elections demonstrated the
virtual inexistence of consistent abstentionism. They also
discussed political abstentionism, deﬁned as different from
“social abstentionism” (based on social integration, or lack
of it) in that it depends on individual political commitment
and appraisal of the political situation. Meanwhile, other
case studies had used participation data derived from
signature lists (Brusset and Thomas, 1971; Toinet, 1968,
1978; Sineau and Mossuz-Lavau, 1978; Restier-Melleray,
1982; Subileau and Toinet, 1986), generally describing
abstention patterns from series of 4–8 elections. Finally,
sociologist Peneff (1981) beneﬁted from sources including
a mention of occupation in his analysis of the 1977–78
elections in the town of Nantes. He highlighted the over-
representation of abstention in working-class stations and
of high turnout in middle- and upper-class environments
and was the ﬁrst to systematically use cross tabulation for
more than two variables. Most of these studies however
only tested monovariate, mono-level explanations on
a limited number of ballots.This situation has changed with a recent revival in the
analysis of signature listsdeven if French electoral analysis
is dominated by studies relying on data from opinion
surveys. INSEE “Electoral Participation” surveys have
matched data from signature lists for national elections
with the Permanent Demographic Sample established in
1988.4 Based on an unparalleled sample of 39,000 regis-
tered French voters, results from this study (Morin, 1990;
Héran and Rouault, 1995; Héran, 1997, 2004; Clanché,
2003; Désesquelles, 2004; Jugnot, 2007) describe patterns
of abstention and correlate them with variables such as
gender, age, level of education, employment status, etc.
However, it is impossible to follow individual behaviours
for sequences of more than two elections or four ballots.
The other revival of lists studies tries to solve this problem
by focussing on local cases. Braconnier and Dormagen
(2007) examined signature lists from a polling station in
the Parisian suburb over more than 30 years (1974–2005),
mixing various methods (exit poll questionnaires, neigh-
bourhood surveys, interviews, and ethnographic observa-
tion) to contextualize their analysis of voting behaviour.
They highlighted the extremely high rate of conformity in
participation behaviours among married couples. We
expand on this research by studying voting behaviours over
three decades, and not only within married couples, but
within all households in the same polling station.3. The case study: a polling station in the Paris region
Our data come from a polling station located in the
Northern part of an old village that has been merged into
a “new town” (ville nouvelle in French) of the Paris region in
the 1970s. “New towns” were four big districts in the
periphery of the Paris region, chosen by the government,
whose development in terms of economic activities,
transports, etc. was planned in order to achieve a new
demographic balance in the region.
The part of the town that includes our polling station
has been relatively protected from urbanization; it is called
“the (old) village” by its inhabitants and is almost exclu-
sively made of detached houses. Most of them are reno-
vated vegetable farms or adjacent village houses of various
sizes built before 1939 and often before 1914, with
a minority of manors and recent detached houses. Most are
primary residences. The village, where the oldest farmers’
families still live, is currently much sought-after by the
local property market; it is also the residence of many
municipal ofﬁcers, including the mayor. The station is
overwhelmingly residential, mostly because many small
businesses have collapsed due tomalls opening in the “new
town”. What is important for us is that collective housing
scarcely exists, with the exception of a retirement home,
a social housing centre, and a small rooming house. In
5 There are many elections and ballots in certain years, the maximum
being 1988 with four elections and seven ballots (presidential, general,
municipal, and a national referendum).
6 21% were born in the “new town” and coded as local; 37% were born
in the Paris region, 34% somewhere else in France and 8% in other
countries.almost all cases, it is thus possible and easy to identify
electorate households.
According to an exit poll conducted at the station during
the 2007 presidential elections, the population is older and
more educated in the village than in French society and it
has a larger upper class. Even if only 55% of registered
citizens and 65% of actual voters responded, which tended
to over-represent highly educated groups and under-
represent retirees, it is worth noticing that retailers and
business owners (6.3%, compared to 3.2% in France),
middle-class occupations (21.8% vs. 12%) and especially the
upper-class (32.9% vs. 7.8%) were overrepresented at the
expense of retirees (14.5% vs. 30.2%) and employees (2.1%
vs. 16.1%). Three-fourths of those questioned declared
themselves to be homeowners. Half worked in the public
sector and one-ﬁfth as independent professionals. 65% had
an education level higher or equal to an associates degree
(bac þ 2), 50% had a bachelor’s degree (bac þ 3) and 30%
had a master’s degree (bac þ 5). Half of those questioned
were registered at the station since 1997 or before.
The number of people registered on the commune’s
electoral rolls increased during the period studied, at the
same rate as the French total number of registered voters.
The village polling station thus had to be divided in three.
We in fact studied only one of the three stations: in the
oldest lists, we ignored addresses not currently included at
the station. The observed polling station had 767 registered
voters in 2008, while there were only 549 registered voters
in the area in 1982. This increase in registrations (þ38% over
the period) was achieved in successive stages during years
preceding high-stake elections: the 1993 general elections
and the presidential elections in 1995, 2002, and 2007.
Finally, the observed polling station has high turnout
rates. Since 1988, its total turnout rate has exceeded that of
the commune’s from 2 to 7 points in all general and presi-
dential elections. As compared to the rest of France, it also
shows more participation in these national elections, but
less in the local and European elections. It is also politically
peculiar at the local scale: while the Socialist Party has ran
the commune since 1989, our polling station, where
previous leaders still live, leans to the right and has the
highest far-right voting rates in the commune. Results for
right-wing candidates in the second round of presidential
elections exemplify this result: Giscard won 51% in the
station in 1981 (versus 42% in the commune), Chirac 54% in
1988 (versus 41%) and 66% in 1995 (versus 49%) and Sar-
kozy 56% in 2007 (versus 40%).
4. Variables extracted from registration lists
Our data covers 44 ballots, corresponding to 27 different
national, European, and local elections over the period
1982–2008. We know the behaviour of all 1799 registered
voters, each one being registered in the polling station for 1
to 44 elections, so that we observe a little less than 30,000
acts of participation or abstention. One-third of voters
(30.5%) were already registered in 1982, so that we do not
know exactly when their ﬁrst registration took place. They
form the initial cohort. 160 voters have been registered
during the entire period; they represent 8.9% of the pop-
ulation, but 29.1% of registered voters in 1982, and 20.7% ofregistered voters in 2008, and have carried out over 7000
acts of turnout or abstention. In contrast, 189 voters (10.5%
of the population over the period) have been registered at
the station for only one year, representing one or several
ballots.5 One of the ﬁrst lessons in our study is thus that we
should not underestimate the extent of changes in the lists
of potential voters: “the electorate” must be thought of as
a stock constantly subject to inﬂows and outﬂows. That it to
say that the main issue for the study of electoral volatility
isn’t political orientation (from one political party to
another between two ballots) but registration and electoral
participation (from participation to abstention, and
conversely) (Lehingue, 2003, 2009).
Signature lists apparently contain few useful data, but
we managed to extract information that was not directly
available at ﬁrst glance.We know the ﬁrst and last names of
voters, their date and place of birth (that we coded in
discrete generations and origins6), their address, the
marital status of womendand we know if they did or did
not vote. We could also infer gender (51.3% of women), age
at each election, age at the ﬁrst or last registration (in our
polling station), distance between the address and the
polling station (19%were coded as close, or less than 500m,
38% as far, or more than 1 km, and 43% asmedium distance)
and additional information on the marital status (e.g for
widows). We also coded addresses in seven districts
deﬁned by the ethnographic study in order to appear as
socially homogeneous as possible in terms of both class and
date of arrival in the village, in order to partly obviate our
lack of occupational data.
Our main task was however to create two sets of indi-
cators: one describing households and the place of indi-
viduals within them, the other describing different
dimensions of the participation behaviour.
The peculiarities of the polling station and our ethno-
graphic inquiry allowed us to identify “electorate house-
holds” grouping individual voters that lived at the same
address and had family links among themselves (generally
married couples or parents and children). When two
households shared an address, we separated them on the
basis of these family ties. Of course, “electorate households”
do not necessarily coincide with actual households, which
often include unregistered adults and minors. In other
words, a two-person electorate household can very well
correspond to an actual household of four or more people.
However, our premise is that the electorate household
corresponds to all or part of an actual household. The
“electorate household” is thus not an analytic ﬁction, even
if it does not fully represent the environment that produces
voter turnout.
We were able to deﬁne 938 electoral households living
at 396 different addresses. Half of them had only one
registered voter (49.8%), one quarter had two (27.6%), one
tenth had three (9.4%) or four (8.8%) and others up to seven.
For the sake of clarity, we retained a static deﬁnition of
households, valid for the entire period. For example,
a household with two married registered voters, whose
child registered only in 2000, is considered to be a three-
person electorate household. In the future, we plan to
investigate such dynamics more closely, especially in order
to compare the parents’ behaviour before and after their
children’s registration.
After having deﬁned households, we were able to char-
acterize the status of voters within them, based on their
connections with other voters in the same household: it is
not an absolute characterization of an individual’smarital or
parental status. We have ﬁrst distinguished 14 different
types of status in an electorate household, which we then
arranged into 5 broader groups.7 “Couples” are those who
conjugally live with another registered voter and without
any children registered as potential voters (27% of voters
were labeled as parts of couples, including 22%married and
5% involved in another form of partnership8). “Children”
(21% of voters) have at least one “parent” (22% of voters,
generally also living with a spouse) present in their elec-
torate households, and vice versa. This category has nothing
to dowith the voter’s age (some “children” are 50 years old;
all voters are over 18). 80% of “children” are also brothers or
sisters of registered voters in the householddan informa-
tion that we will use in future studies. “Others” (4%) are
people living with at least one other registered voter, but
whodidnot fall in theprevious categories. Finally, 26%of the
total populationwas coded as “isolated,” which means that
they were the only voter in their electorate household. It
must be noticed that “isolated” voters could in fact livewith
a partner and children, if they were not registered on the
electoral rolls of the observed station.
Finally, the signature lists informed us about voter
turnout itself, with very detailed longitudinal data.We thus
were able to create many different indicators (e.g. differ-
entiating the tendency to participate in national and/or in
local elections); only three will be used here. Two of them
are individual indicators of the tendency to participate and
the tendency to have a changing participation behaviour;
the third one is not an individual indicator, but ametric that
allows to assess the similarity in the exact moments of
participation and abstention between any possible couple
of voters. These three indicators should of course be
considered together. If one accepts to deﬁne electoral
volatility not only as an issue of partisan loyalty (are voters
faithful to a party?) but also as an issue for participation
(howmany times and when do people go to the polls?), the
three indicators allow us not only to analyze individual
volatility by measuring each individual participation rate7 The more reﬁned coding will be used in subsequent publications,
especially in order to differentiate mothers from fathers in the trans-
mission of participation behaviours.
8 Five cases of couples living with a brother or sister have been added
to this category. “Partners” are two voters at the same address that we
assumed were living together; the category is presumably under-
estimated, because we assumed partnership on the basis of compatible
ages and registration dates and different sexes and/or personal knowl-
edge of the persons involved.(Participation Index) in relation with individual propensity
to change one’s behaviour (Change of Behavior Index), but
also to focus on the collective dimension of volatility by
comparing participation trajectories (Similarity Index).
A signature list only gives two possible results for each
ballot: A (abstention) and P (participation), but there is an
implicit third possibility: N, non-registration in the
observed polling station. The ﬁrst and simplest indicator of
participation behaviour is the mean individual turnout rate
nP/(nA þ nP) or Participation Index (PI). We excluded from
its calculation the voters who were only registered for one
or two ballots (n ¼ 134, while 1665 voters are included).
With a median at 69, a mean at 63, and quartiles at 42 and
89, the PI conﬁrms that the people in our polling station
have a tendency to vote often. Its dispersion conﬁrms
Lancelot, Subileau, and Toinet’s theses. Intermittent
participation seems to be the most widespread behaviour,
with 78% of registered voters (77.6%). Only 262 voters (16%
of those registered for at least 3 elections) are consistent
participationists (PI ¼ 100), while 111 (7%) are consistent
abstentionists (PI ¼ 0). In addition, 27% of those consistent
abstentionists have been registered for less than 4 ballots,
and 58% for less than 8 ballots: long-term consistent
abstentionism is extremely rare.
Our second individual indicator measures the average
propensity of a voter to switch behaviour at each election,
either from participation to abstention or from abstention
to participation. This Change of Behaviour Index (CBI) is
calculated as follows:
CBI ¼ number of changes=ðnumber of registrations1Þ100
For example, in the participation sequence PPAP, there are
four ballots, 3 opportunities to change behaviour, and 2
actual changes of behaviour (from P to A, then from A to P),
hence a CBI of 67. Themean CBI for all 1665 voters taken into
account is 23, the median is 21, and the quartiles are 6 and
33. By deﬁnition, the CBI partly varies according to the PI:
the voters who have a very low or high PI (quasi-consistent
abstentionists or participationists) have a very low CBI. On
the other hand, most voters have an average PI and differ-
entiate according to their CBI. For example, voters whose PI
is 50 will have a very high CBI if their voting behaviours
regularly alternated, but a very low CBI if they consistently
participated for a long period and then consistently did not
vote for a long period: two types of behaviour that are likely
to rely on very different mechanisms.
Finally, we introduce a third measure that is not an
individual behaviour index, but a measure of the exact
temporal similarity between individual sequences of
participation (Similarity Index, or SI). It can be used to
deﬁne a degree of similarity between any couple of
participation sequences among our 1799 voters. This
measure is based on the “optimal matching analysis”
method, also often called “sequence analysis” (Abbott,
1995; Brzinsky-Fay and Kohler, 2010; Lesnard, 2010).9 The9 All our calculations and ﬁgures involving variants of sequence anal-
ysis have been made thanks to the R-package TraMineR (Gabadinho et al.,
2008).
Fig. 1. The Pascal household.“optimal matching distance” provides a measure of simi-
larity between any pair of possible sequences. The
sequences considered here are individual series of behav-
iours, which can be represented as a series of letters rep-
resenting each ballot, for example:
NNPPPPPPPPPPPAPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPPAPPPPPPPA:
The distance between two sequencesdand reciprocally
the similarity between themd depends on the number of
operations needed to transform a series of letters into
another, by either adding or subtracting letters or trans-
forming an N into a P, a P into an N, etc. The researcher has
to choose some of the parameters in this metrics. Here, we
ﬁxed lower substitution costs between non-registration
and participation or abstention (0.51) than between vote
and abstention (1), so that two sequences presenting
opposite behaviours (participation on the one hand,
abstention on the other hand) at the same ballot are
considered very different, while two sequences presenting
a non-registration on the one hand, and a vote or an
abstention on the other hand would be considered less
different.10 Furthermore, we chose very high “insertion and
deletion costs,” or “indel costs,” (5) as compared to
substitution costs. This allows to consider sequences with
similar patterns occurring at different dates as different, as
what we want to assess here is the similarity of behaviour
in the same ballots. If three persons vote one time, then do
not vote at seven ballots, then are not registered anymore,
their sequences are considered identical. If one of them had
voted one time and then not voted seven times, but at the
end of our period, he or she would be considered as very
different from the others in our metrics.
In our ﬁgures, each rectangle represents one ballot and
ballots are arranged in chronological order, from 1982 to
2008. The horizontal axis is thus a time axis, but distances
on this axis are related to the number of polls, not to
calendar time. Black represents participation, grey absten-
tion and white non-registration. Each individual is labeled
according to his or her gender and relationships with other10 If the only possible states had been participation and abstention, we
could more simply have used the number of differences between two
sequences as our indicator. The use of an optimal matching distance
allowed us to include patterns of non-registration while giving them less
substantial weight than patterns of participation and abstention. This is
allowed by the choice of a lower substitution cost (0.51, as compared to
1). We actually set it at the lowest possible level allowed by the algo-
rithm. A substitution cost of 0.5 or lower would lead the algorithm to
decide that the distance between vote and abstention is shorter if we ﬁrst
go from vote to non-registration, and then from non-registration to
abstention, which is not what wewant to achieve (see Abbott and Hrycak,
1990 for pictures showing how the algorithm uses substitution costs to
deﬁne the shortest possible distance between two sequences).members of the “electorate househould”. For example, the
Pascal household (Fig. 1) has four voters: the parents and
their two children. The parents and the eldest son regis-
tered at the same time, whereas the daughter registered
later for a period of ﬁve ballots and then left the polling
station. From visual inspection of the ﬁgure, it can be
assumed that the PI for the mother and the father are close,
very low, but higher than the son’s; likewise, the PI for the
father is without doubt higher than the mother’s, yet the
daughter holds the highest PI. The calculated PI values are
indeed 55 (father), 45 (mother), 35 (son), 60 (daughter). On
the other hand, the parents’ CBI are the same (47), close to
the daughter’s (50), and higher than the son’s (37), as he
had a longer period of consistent abstention. Finally, the
household as a whole is homogeneous, according to our
three criteria, with a rather low PI average (49), a rather
high CBI average (45), not much dispersion on these two
indicators and rather similar voting patterns at each ballot.
The internal mean similarity of the household (calculated
from our SI between each couple of members) is 2.6, versus
7 for the mean SI of the whole population. To sum up, this
household is not only quite abstentionist and versatile, but
also homogeneous for each of our indicators. The parents
and the son especially only diverged between their 9th and
14th ballots; even the daughter behaved like her father in
three of her ﬁve ballots.5. The homogeneity of electorate households
The ﬁrst statistical result of our study is that what is true
for the Pascals is true for our population as a whole:
belonging to an “electorate household” structures voter
turnout. In other words, the electorate households are
homogenizing participation behaviours within them. And
this is true if we consider the precise moment of voting
(Similarity Index) as well as the Participation Index or the
Change of Behaviour Index.
We reconstructed the “electorate households” in order
to test the hypothesis that they acted as primary groups
shaping individual voting behaviours. We thus have to
prove that the members of each household tend to
resemble each other more than if they were randomly
assigned to households of the same size. We will do it here
in an univariate way, using ANOVA and similar techniques
suited to our Similarity Index; we will then conﬁrm this
ﬁnding by including an household effect in the multivar-
iate, multilevel model presented in Part 6. Three clariﬁca-
tions must be made before presenting our results.
First, the tests presented here were carried out on the
subset of 1179 voters who were members of an electorate
household including at least two voters, and for whom we
were able to calculate the PI and the CBI. Household
Table 1
Participation index in two-voter (þ) households.
Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F value Pr (>F)
Household 418 658414 1575 3.76 0.000 ***
Residuals 760 318044 418
Address 281 455785 1622 2.79 0.000 ***
Residuals 897 520673 580
*** denotes signiﬁcance at the 0.001 level.
Table 2
Participation index in three-voter (þ) households.
Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F value Pr (>F)
Household 180 307296 1707 3.5 0.000 ***
Residuals 522 254796 488
Address 159 272932 1717 3.22 0.000 ***
Residuals 543 289159 533
*** denotes signiﬁcance at the 0.001 level.
Table 3
Change of behaviour index in two-voter (þ) households.
Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F value Pr (>F)
Household 418 236527 566 2.52 0.000 ***
Residuals 760 170913 225
Address 281 153609 547 1.93 0.000 ***
Residuals 897 253830 283
*** denotes signiﬁcance at the 0.001 level.
Table 4
Change of behaviour index in three-voter (þ) households.
Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F value Pr (>F)
Household 180 85316 474 1.89 0.000 ***
Residuals 522 130688 250
Address 159 76829 483 1.89 0.000 ***
Residuals 543 139175 256
*** denotes signiﬁcance at the 0.001 level.homogeneity may still be suspected to be overestimated
due to the large number of two-person electorate house-
holds, often corresponding to couples (it might be argued
that similarity among couples relies on speciﬁc mecha-
nisms). In order to take this limitation into account, we
separately analyzed the subset of 703 voters who were
members of households including at least three voters
registered for at least three ballots.
Second, in the univariate calculations presented here,
other factors than the mere fact of living together, such as
similar dates of birth (in couples) or of initial registration,
might induce homogeneity in behaviours. ANOVA is only
used to provide an initial measurement of within-
household homogeneity.
Third, we introduced another control by performing
ANOVA calculations based on the fact of living at the same
address, but not necessarily in the same household. If, as
we believe, the homogenizing effect of the household on
behaviour is due to internal social factors, like the existence
of frequent interactions and marital or kin relationships
between members, the homogeneity of within household
behaviours should be far more important than that of
within-address behaviours. Living in the same place obvi-
ously increases the chance of being socially similar and
even of interacting,11 but we try to test the additional
cohesion caused by actually living together.
According to Tables 1–4, the behaviour variations are
much larger between households than within households;
for most of the indexes, our tests also indicate that electoral
households have much stronger homogenizing effects than
addresses, even if the latter prove signiﬁcant.
The fact that voters from the same household havemore
similar behaviours than voters randomly grouped together11 The reality is in fact more complicated due to the longitudinal nature
of our data. 23% of voters over the period belong to households that
succeed (or precede) another household at the same address. In this
instance, there are fewer reasons to believe that households sharing an
address would behave in similar ways. Half of the voters live in
a household cohabiting with at least one other household at the same
address at the same time, while 27% of voters live at an address with only
one household.is proved by these tests, both in terms of average partici-
pation and of versatility. The similarity of the overall
behaviours of participation is more impressive than that of
the tendency to be versatile, but the latter certainly exists.
Tests on households with at least three voters also conﬁrm
these results: homogeneity does not only exist within
couples, but also within larger groups based on other types
of relationships. Voters living at the same address are also
characterized by homogeneous behaviours. When all
households with at least two voters are included, the
Fischer tests however show that homogeneity is much
higher within households than within addresses. This is
less true for households including at least three voters, but
in this case, there are fewer examples of different house-
holds living at the same address. Our analysis thus ﬁrmly
points in the direction of homogeneity between neigh-
bours and even stronger homogeneity within households.
Participation behaviours, both in terms of average level and
versatility, are determined primarily inside the household,
but also inﬂuenced by its closest environment.
ANOVA could however lead us to believe in a general
homogeneitywithin households,while in reality, only some
of themmight be very homogeneous, while others could be
extremely heterogeneous. To deal with this bias, we calcu-
lated internal variance indicators for each household: the
results conﬁrm a strong homogeneity for most households.
While the standard deviation of the PI of the whole 1179
subpopulation is 29, onequarter of theobservedhouseholds
(103 out of 419) have a zero standard deviation (their voters
all have the same PI), and 48% (203 out of 419) have a stan-
dard deviation higher than 0 but lower than 20.
We can ﬁnally measure the homogeneity of households
in terms of precise timing of participation (our SI) thanks to
“pseudo-ANOVA” calculations (Studer et al., 2011). Based
on a very large number of data permutations, they allow to
perform a procedure similar to ANOVA for an indicator that
is not measured at the individual level, but consists in
distances between pairs of individual sequences. What the
test does is thus basically to assess whether within-
household similarity is signiﬁcantly higher than between-
household similarity, or, put differently, whether there is
Table 5
Similarity index in two-voter (þ) households.




Pr (>F) Pseudo R2
Household 469 5700 12.15 2.87 0.000 0.61
Residuals 862 3654 4.24
Address 302 3871 12.82 2.41 0 0.41
Residuals 1029 5484 5.32
Table 6
Similarity index in three-voter (þ) households.




Pr (>F) Pseudo R2
Household 210 3087 14.7 2.81 0 0.49
Residuals 603 3156 5.23
Address 183 2678 14.64 2.59 0 0.43
Residuals 630 3564 5.66more similarity between household members than if they
were randomly assigned to households of the same size
(see Tables 5 and 6).12
Again, households are signiﬁcantly homogeneous in
terms of precise moments of participation, and, particularly
when two-voters households are included, they are much
more homogeneous than addresses. Finally, an additional
test performed only on the voters who were consistently
registered during our whole period also conﬁrmsdeven
more than the othersdthat the similarities are stronger
within households than between households (Pseudo
R2 ¼ 0.75). This conﬁrms that our SI is not too heavily
inﬂuenced by patterns of non-registration and really
captures similarities in the exact moments of participation.
In order to more concretely present what our results
measure, we calculated SI variances within each household
and added this measure of within-household homogeneity
to our graphical representations of participation behav-
iours (Fig. 2). For the whole population, the SI variance is 7.
Out of the 470 households with two ormore voters, 97 have
an internal variance of 0 (exactly the same behaviour at
each ballot), 93 have a variance higher than 0 but lower or
equal to 1 (including the Jasmins of Fig. 2), and only 64 have
a variance equal to or higher than 5 (including theMerles of
Fig. 2, with the highest variance for a four-person house-
hold). Of course, two- or three-person households are
especially homogeneous. Even in large households,
however, homogeneity is often present: among 123
households including four or more voters, 21 have a vari-
ance lower than 2, 77 have a variance lower than 5, and
only 19 have a variance higher than 6. It is true for house-
holds with both high and low average participation levels.
Homogeneity on SI is therefore a very general
phenomenon, even more than homogeneity on PI and CBI:12 As the SI can be calculated even for voters who were registered for
a short time, this calculation includes all voters belonging to households
of the mentioned size. Given the large number of households and
addresses, as well as the small size of each group, calculations were
performed with 5000 permutations and the distribution of Pseudo F for
all of these permutations has been observed: it conﬁrms the signiﬁcance
of the results.what households tend to shape is the precise moment of
voting, even more than the general tendency to participate
or the degree of versatility.
6. The status in the household as a participation
factor
The second main result of our study is the fact that the
precise status of the voter inside his or her “electorate
household” shapes his or her participation behaviour, both
in terms of average participation and versatility.
As we saw in Part 5, belonging to a given household
shapes participation behaviours, that are generally quite
homogeneous. However, perfectly homogeneous house-
holds are rare. What is interesting it that even this
measure of heterogeneity appears to be partly related to
the status within the “electorate household” (parent, child,
etc.). This is thus another form of inﬂuence of households
on electoral participation: what matter here is not the
homogenization of behaviours within households, but the
fact that some behaviours are correlated with a particular
position held in any household. This result holds not only
when this single variable is considered, but when it is
confronted with other individual attributes (sex, place of
birth, age, date of registration, etc.) that may explain
participation behaviours and that we included in a multi-
level model capturing the homogenizing effect of house-
hold: the status in the household always keeps
a signiﬁcant independent effect.
Let us however begin with an univariate analysis. A
boxplot representing PI values according to the status in
the household (Fig. 3) shows a remarkable gradation in the
participation index level based on the status in the
household. In particular, the boxes representing the parents
and the isolated are quite distinct. The other categories
overlap, but parents have a tendency to be more partic-
ipationist than couples, who themselves participate a little
more than children or other household members, and
deﬁnitely more than the isolated. In fact, pairwise ANOVA
testing shows that the mean PI is signiﬁcantly different (at
the 5% and generally at the 1% level) between each couple
of categories, except, on the one hand, between children
and “other” and, on the other hand, between isolated and
“other” (“other” being a residual category that only
includes 68 voters, while the rest of our categories group
380 to 500 of them). Participation is thus strongly related to
the status in the household.
Integration, if not social bonding, promotes electoral
participation. We are however not suggesting that the
“isolated,” as deﬁned here, are less endowed in general
social ties than the “parents.” For example, fathers with
young children and a foreign wife are classiﬁed as “iso-
lated.” What we observe here is thus more subtle, as our
deﬁnitions are centred on ties within the electorate
household. First, to be isolated, e.g., not to live with any
other registered voter, leads to less participation. Second,
being both married to a voter and the parent of a registered
voter (which is the case of most “parents”) leads to more
participation than only having a registered partner
(“couple”). Perhaps more surprisingly, the status in the
household also has a signiﬁcant effect (according to
Fig. 2. Three household examples with a low, a medium and a high internal SI variance (pseudo-variance).ANOVA) on the CBI, our versatility indicator. This effect is
however more difﬁcult to interpret and less distinct.
The status in the household is in any case not the only
factor that inﬂuences the PI and CBI. In order to measure its
independent effect, other determinants of participation
must be considered, at least those that can be observedFig. 3. Participation index boxplot according to the status in the household.
Note: The vertical line represents the median for each category. The length
of each box represents the interquartile range. The dashed lines connect the
box to the maximum and minimum for each category.from our source. We have thus analyzed data on the 1665
voters who participated in at least 3 ballots in a multivar-
iate, multilevel regression modelling PI. Its parameters
have been chosen thanks to preliminary univariate ANOVA
tests that have also been performed for CBI.
When considered separately, most of our available
variables seem to have a signiﬁcant effect on PI (Table 7): it
is the case for the status in the household aswell as the date
of birth and the date of registration (coded in cohorts
constructed after an observation of PI variations between
each year), the place of birth and, less distinctly, the district.
However, sex or distance from the home to the polling
station (divided into three classes) have no signiﬁcant
effect. It may be surprising that sex weighs so little here,
since women are generally believed to participate less than
men; but this is especially true when control for the
education level is possible, which is not the case here
(Désesquelles, 2004). In contrast, the status in the house-
hold and the date of registration appear to be the only
signiﬁcant indicators for the change in behaviour index
(Table 8): we thus do not model it further, having sufﬁ-
ciently proved that it is shaped at the level of households.
Which of these effects signiﬁcantly matter the most in
amultivariate model remains to bemeasured.We ﬁrst built
an ordinary least squares regression: the bestmodel is given
in Table 9. No speciﬁcation gave signiﬁcant results either for
sex or for district, conﬁrming that these variables seem to
have no clear effect in our polling station, even other things
being equal. The overall additional explanatory powerof the
model, as measured by its R-squared, remains modest:
different socio-economic variables are likely to inﬂuence
participation. However, some effects are signiﬁcant, of
a high magnitude and substantially interesting.
Table 7









Sex 1 431 431 0.45 0.502
Residuals 1663 1589900 956
Place of birth 3 10880 3627 3.81 0.009 **
Residuals 1661 1579451 951
Birth cohort 3 20365 6788 7.18 0.000 ***
Residuals 1661 1569966 945
Inscription cohort 2 32291 16146 17.22 0.000 ***
1662 1558040 937
District 6 12865 2144 2.25 0.036 *
Residuals 1658 1577466 951
Distance to the
polling station
2 2916 1458 1.53 0.218
Residuals 1662 1587415 955
Status in the
household
3 10880 3627 3.81 0.010 **
Residuals 1661 1579451 951
Signif. Codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘þ’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1.In addition, the modest R-squared of the linear regres-
sion can at least partly be explained by the very household
effect that we demonstrated in our previous part. If indi-
vidual participation indexes tend to be very similar inside
each household, regardless of obvious differences at least of
sex and date of birth that should be present in each
household, it follows that a model that only takes into
account individual variables should poorly capture the
determinants of voting behaviour. In order both to give an
idea of the relative weight of household level and
individual-level factors of participation and to assess which
of the individual factors are still signiﬁcant when the
household effect is taken into account, we have used
a multilevel model. Although the latter better represents
our data than the ordinary least squares regression, we
have chosen to report the results for bothmodels in Table 9,
in the interest of readers not accustomed to multilevel
modelling. We also wanted to point out the fact that,
however strong and interesting the household effect thatTable 8









Sex 1 229 229 0.64 0.423
Residuals 1663 592116 356
Place of birth 3 2769 923 2.6 0.051 þ
Residuals 1661 589575 355
Birth cohort 3 1722 574 1.61 0.184
Residuals 1661 590623 356
Inscription cohort 2 12306 6153 17.63 0.000 ***
Residuals 1662 580039 349
District 6 1933 322 0.9 0.490
Residuals 1658 590411 356
Distance to the
polling station
2 1640 820 2.31 0.100 þ
Residuals 1662 590705 355
Status in the
household
4 11659 2915 8.33 0.000 ***
Residuals 1660 580686 350
Signif. Codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘þ’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1.the multilevel model enables us to measure, other effects
keep the same signiﬁcance and magnitude as in the OLS
regression: we do not intend to minimize them in our
interpretation.
Multilevel modelling (Courgeau, 2007) has recently
been used by Johnston et al. (2005a) in a research akin to
ours in that it showed the important weight of household
effects in voting behaviour; it however modelled a political
choice (Conservative voting), not participation itself, thus
offering a view complementary to ours. It also did not
include the status in the household as a variable in multi-
variate models, whereas we ﬁnd it to be one of the most
inﬂuential ones. Orford et al., 2009 used multilevel
modelling to study turnout, especially its connection to the
local geography of voting stations, but could not include
a discussion of the household level.
Multilevel models are routinely used in various areas of
social science to investigate neighbourhood or regional
effects, and especially in education research to investigate
teacher, class or school effects (e.g. Goldstein, 1987;
Bressoux, 2007). We used the R package nlme (Bliese,
2009) to estimate our multilevel models, considering
individuals (level-1 units) as nested in households (level-2
units).
The ﬁrst step of multilevel modelling is to estimate
a so-called “null model” that, like the ANOVA test that we
performed above, allows to assess that something
happens at the non-individual level (here, the household
level), that is that households are internally more
homogeneous than would happen by chance. It is clearly
the case here. According to our null model, the estimate
of between-group variance (Intercept variance t00) is 579
(with a standard deviation of 24), while the estimate of
within-group variance (Residual variance s2) is 433
(SD ¼ 21), so that an estimated 57% of the whole
participation index variance (579/(579 þ 432)) can be
explained by the household effect. This sheds doubts on
any explanation of participation that does not take the
electorate household level into account.
The results of our multilevel model that simulta-
neously takes into account individual variables and the
household so-called “random effect” (reported in Table 9)
however show that the latter does not capture or anni-
hilate the effects of the former: both play an important
role, and including the household effect does not change
much of the signiﬁcance or magnitude of the individual
effects. It only adds to the explanatory power of the
complete model.
In our ﬁnal multilevel model, the between-group vari-
ance t00 is 506 (SD ¼ 22) and the within-group variance s2
is 362 (SD¼ 19), so that, as compared to the null model, 13%
of the between-group variance (1–506/579) and 16% of the
within-group variance (1–362/432) have been accounted
for by our individual-level variables (mainly the status in
the household and the dates of birth and registration). It
means that only a minority of both what makes households
homogeneous and what makes them heterogeneous can be
accounted for by such individual factors, although adding
them to a multilevel model still enhances its general
accuracy. 58% of the variance that is not explained by the
individual factors (506/(506 þ 362)) is still related to the
Table 9
Multivariate linear regression and multilevel model of the participation index.
OLS linear regression Multilevel model with household “random effect”
Estimate Std error t value Pr(>jtj) Estimate Std error t value Pr(>jtj)
Intercept 51 2.69 18.97 <2e-16 *** 54.07 2.91 18.59 <2e-16 ***
Birth cohort
1893–1922 10.47 2.83 3.7 0.0002*** 7.42 2.74 2.71 0.0068**
1923–1948 3.99 2.04 1.96 0.0503þ 3.83 1.82 2.1 0.0358*
1948–1963 Reference Reference
1964–1990 1.59 2.13 0.75 0.4565 2.88 2 1.44 0.1518
Inscription cohort
1982–1984 Reference Reference
1986–1995 3.46 2 1.73 0.0842þ 2.87 1.98 1.45 0.1478
1997–2008 18.19 2.24 8.13 8.56e-16*** 13.86 2.32 5.99 <2e-16***
Status in the household
couple Reference Reference
isolated 16.56 1.99 8.31 <2e-16*** 16.18 2.27 7.13 <2e-16***
other 7.22 3.94 1.83 0.0670þ 1.92 3.85 0.5 0.6177
child 2.8 2.34 1.2 0.2324 3.37 2.71 1.24 0.2146
parent 15.68 1.99 7.56 5.34e-14*** 12.69 2.45 5.17 <2e-16***
Distance to the polling station
far Reference Reference
medium or close 3.99 1.46 2.73 0.0064** 3.52 1.94 1.82 0.0696þ
Place of birth
local Reference Reference
region 2.41 1.96 1.23 0.2200 2.35 1.8 1.31 0.1921
France 4.51 2.06 2.19 0.0288* 4.11 1.92 2.15 0.0321*




Notes : Signif. Codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘þ’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1.
Linear model: Residual standard error: 28.4 on 1651 degrees of freedom. Multiple R-squared: 0.1629, Adjusted R-squared: 0.1564 F-statistic: 24.72 on 13
and 1651 DF, p-value: <2.2e-16. Detection of multicollinearity: all Variance Inﬂation Factors are <3, which indicate that there are no multicollinearity
problems (test performed using the R package car).
Multilevel model: Linear mixed-effects model ﬁt by restricted maximum likelihood estimation (RMLE).household effect, which remains highly signiﬁcant in the
multilevel model (as tested by a comparison with an
identical model not including it).
Our models demonstrate that, even “other things
being equal”dat least, of course, those that we actually
were able to measure in our datad, the status in the
household does play an important role in electoral
participation: being the parent of a registered voter
rather than just part of a couple of voters increases the
Participation Index by more than 15 points in the linear
model and 12 points in the multilevel model, while being
isolated rather than married decreases it by 16 points in
both models. However, children of voters and persons
present in an electorate household with another status do
not signiﬁcantly differ from members of couples in their
participation behaviour.
The distance to the polling station has a signiﬁcant, but
very small effect in the linear model (living close to or not
too far from the station rather than far away increases the
index by 4 points, other things being equal), and is not
really signiﬁcant in themultilevel model. Distance seems to
play a role in enabling participation, but only a limited one.
Our results thus conﬁrm Dupeux’s analysis in a 1952 paper
about the 1871 elections in a rural department, as well as
more recent conclusions by Braconnier and Dormagen
(2007) about blue-collar votersdwhereas our polling
station is urban and over-represents white-collarsdand
Orford et al.’s (2009) results on low salience elections in the
UK. Even when every voter is likely to have access to a car,living far from the polling station is still a constraint on
voter turnout.
Another present, but limited effect is that of the place of
birth. Being born outside of the Paris region, but in France
increases participation by 4 points in both models, in
comparison to being a strict native (raised in the neigh-
bourhood).We believe this effect to be in fact related to two
more important factors in our models: the date of birth and
the date of registration. They have effects that at ﬁrst glance
might seem contradictory. On the one hand, being older
seems to increase the PI, at least for our oldest cohort:
being born in 1893–1922 rather than in 1948–1963
increases the PI by 10 points in the linear model and more
than 7 points in the multilevel model. On the other hand,
the “freshness” of registration is signiﬁcantly associated
with a higher voter turnout: belonging to the most recently
registered (in 1997–2008) rather than the oldest (regis-
tered before 1982 or in 1982–1984) increases the PI by 18
points in the linear model and more than 13 points in the
multilevel model.
The coexistence of these two effects can be explained by
the fact that it is possible to register in the polling station
for the ﬁrst time at an agemuch higher than the voting age,
either after having been a non-registered voter ordwhich
probably happenedmore often in our cased after changing
residences. Our ﬁrst result, having probably more to do
with age than with generation per se, is in itself not
surprising. Participation in France generally decreases from
ages 18 to 30, steadily increases until age 70, then declines,
which is conﬁrmed by our Fig. 4 (see Appendix) (INSEE,
2004). The second result is however more surprising, as
abstention was generally higher in France after 2000 than
before (with the exception of the 2007 presidential elec-
tion). The most recently registered voters, those who, other
things being equal, participated more according to our
models were thus confronted with elections with a low
general participation rate. At the national scale, it has been
shown that voters who registered in 2006, although they
had an overwhelming turnout in the 2007 presidential
elections, had an equally overwhelming abstention in the
legislative election that took place the following month
(Jugnot, 2007).
What we do observe thus has a more local explanation:
something happened in our polling station that did not
happen everywhere, but that deﬁnitely sheds light onmore
general participation mechanisms. Figs. 4 and 5 (see
Appendix) and Table 10 givemore precise indications about
the correlations between date of birth, date of registration
and our Participation Index. They show that what
happened is not a speciﬁc correlation between date of birth
and date of registration in terms of an inﬂux of elderly
people in the town: there are certainly some retirees
among the recently registered voters, but they are a rather
non-participationist minority. What we measure is prob-
ably more the speciﬁc social characteristics of the recently
registered voters, who are likely to be participationist
middle- and upper-class members.
Although the dispersion is high, as shown by Figs. 4 and
5, Table 10 shows very contrasting results between cohorts
that are deﬁned at the same time by the dates of birth and
ﬁrst registration (Figs. 4 and 5 having helped us to deﬁne
those cohorts). It is especially remarkable that recently
registered voters (after 1997) from ages 35 to 60 show the
highest PI average (80), 17 points higher than the overall
average of the polling station, whereas baby-boomers
registered before 1986 are among the most abstentionists,
with an average PI of 49. Although we do not have much
additional information about the “recently registered baby-
boomers” cohort, we know that their speciﬁc voting
behaviour is not explained by a speciﬁc shape of house-
holds (e.g. while many of them are part of voter couples
(37%) or “parents” of other voters (28%), some are also
“isolated” (34%)).
We can therefore make two hypotheses that are speciﬁc
to our ﬁeld of investigation, but might shed light on wider
issues. Our polling station is socially multipolar, which is
reﬂected in voting behaviours differentiating, ﬁrst, two
groups among people who registered before the 1990s and,Table 10
Participation index average by cohort.
Date of ﬁrst registration
1982–1984 1986–1995 1997–2008 All
Date of birth
1893–1922 66 46 79 64
1923–1948 69 64 72 68
1949–1963 49 60 80 62
1964–1990 45 55 64 60
All 62 58 69 63second, newcomers from both of these groups. Among
those who registered early in our period (or before the
period that we actually observe), two groups can be
distinguished. On the one hand, it includes older persons
who generally vote, which makes sense considering their
age, the fact that they have lived in what was a rural
environment (in France, the rural areas generally vote more
than the urban areas), and what we can guess about their
socio-economic status and especially about its change
other time. Members of this generation have indeed
beneﬁted from the creation of the “new town” by selling
almost all of their land at attractive prices. On the other
hand, we also ﬁnd early registered baby-boomers who,
contrary to what their age would predict, are not express-
ing any interest in voting. This might be related to a rejec-
tion of transformations of the new town, with less direct
beneﬁts for them and several controversial evolutions
(urbanization, the arrival of a foreign population brought
on by social housing facilities). Finally, the fact that
newcomers of all age groups (registered in 1997–2008) are
pretty much participationist can be interpreted as the
product of the arrival of middle- and upper-class graduates
in a place that has becomemore socially selectivedbecause
of higher prices of real estate. In addition, the temporary
presence of students might have played a more marginal
role. It is worth noticing that this presence translates into
an effect of the date of registration, not of the place of birth,
although both are obviously partly correlated. What is
important here is the social context of arrival in the town
and more generally of registration, more than the fact of
being born precisely in the village, in the region or else-
where in France.
7. Discussion
The study of nearly 30 years of voter signatures in
a polling station of the Paris region has revealed two major
results. First, electorate household membership is a struc-
turing factor in electoral turnout: a remarkable homoge-
neity can be observed in the participation behaviour of
members of the same households, be it in terms of the
global participation rate, versatility or precise timing of
voting. Second, the precise position of each voter in the
household is an important determinant of the turnout
level: members of households including more than one
voter have a higher tendency to participate, and all the
more when they are the parent of another voter.
Our research not only provides new results, but also
raises new questions. An obvious limitation of our work lies
in our lack of information on precise social characteristics
of voters. We had planned to use the fact of living in one of
seven different districts, broadly characterized as of
different social levels, as a proxy, but this variable did not
prove signiﬁcant in any of our models, possibly because the
area as a whole was anyway socially homogeneous, and we
had no proxy at the individual scale. The general validity of
our two main results (household homogeneity in voting
patterns and the effect of status in the household on
turnout) thus deserves to be tested in polling stations with
different social characteristics and, if possible, with infor-
mation on individual social level. What we have provided
Fig. 5. Participation Index by year of ﬁrst registration. Note: The smoothing
curve is built on a moving average of 50 points. When the registration
happened before 1982, it is considered here to have happened in 1982.here is a replicable methodology allowing such compara-
tive studies based on data that are actually produced by the
act of voting, not by discourses about it.
Our data set will also allow further analyses. Three
extensions are already underway. We are ﬁrst examining
the relationship between behaviours of parents and chil-
dren, in order to prove or disprove the family reproduction
of political behaviour (here, participation) and to ﬁnely
distinguish its dimensions, e.g. with the speciﬁc, possibly
non-symmetrical roles of mothers and fathers. Second, we
want to consider the borders of households and the status
in the household in a more dynamic way, in order to reﬁne
our analysis of electorate household homogeneity and to
deﬁne the mechanisms that underly it. For example, we
want to study the effect of a child’s ﬁrst registrationdhis or
her admittance to electoral citizenshipdon the parents’
voting pattern. In our static analysis, being “parent” leads to
voting more as being part of a “couple”: is it still true if we
take longitudinal, individual data into account? Finally, we
want to add other indicators of participation to our general
picture, particularly investigating whether households
effects on voting behaviours differ for local and national
elections, and for elections generally showing a very high or
a very low turnout.Acknowledgements
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